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Abstract 
In the recent decades, the privatizations of state-owed 
enterprises have becoming a global trend.  There are many 
nations privatized their infrastructure and services, such as gas, 
electricity, water, railway, sewerage… etc.  However, the 
privatized monopoly enterprises have achieved the fruit of 
super-profit; the general public began to question the 
effectiveness of the privatization towards to the newly created 
monopoly enterprises.  So the regulations of the public utilities 
required immediate attentions from government.   
 
The main objective of this research is to review on 
literature on the privatization of the monopoly enterprises 
through its procedures and investigate whether the 
government required to apply necessary regulations onto 
it.  As a result, the governments of the developed 
nations are relying on the effective control to create more 
economic benefits.   
 
At last, this research would combine all the regulating 
models used in the developed nations and may use as a 
reference to any government or who else required such 
relevant findings towards to privatization in their nations.  
 
 
1.1 Motivation 
In the recent decades, the privatizations of 
state-owed enterprises have becoming a global trend.  
There are more and more nations privatized their 
infrastructure and services after UK made a lead, such as 
gas, electricity, water, railway, sewerage… etc.  
However, the privatized enterprises are not simply 
transferring the ownership from public owned to private 
enterprises but required governmental regulation onto it.  
Each nation was expecting better economic performance 
from the private ownership and effective governmental 
regulation.  
 
    However the public started to question the super 
profit from the privatized enterprises (so called 
“privatized monopoly enterprises”) achieved, and doubts 
the effectiveness on the regulation of the privatized 
enterprises.  In the recent years, UK government has 
raised over £ 5,000 million of ‘windfall tax’ from the 
privatized enterprises and its shareholders.  Due to the 
public discontent, the labor government has set up an 
inter-departmental committee to launch investigations to 
study this phenomenon.  The key point of this research 
is to study whether regulatory office may stop the 
privatized monopoly enterprises from huge profits and 
make sure the service quality are maintained.  
 
State-owned-enterprises (shorten as S.O.E. 
hereafter) are commonly monopolized characteristics due 
to its network economics of scale and scope.  If 
competitors would like to enter the industry, they must 
rebuild the whole distribution network repeatedly.  The 
result from that would be a great waste and increase the 
costs and lowering the general public’s interests and the 
economic efficiency. (Chanter, 1993)  Based on this 
factor, most nations controlled the monopolized 
industries directly or nationalized to solve the monopoly 
issues.  However, the operation performances of S.O.E. 
have shown some severe flaws on: governmental direct 
control and the ownerships of the S.O.E.  There are also 
some flaws on S.O.E. over the years: 1) lack of sufficient 
profit motivation; 2) lack of own decision-making power; 
3) politics intervention operational decisions to cause the 
increase of costs and capital wastage. (Aharoni, 1986)   
 
Thus, privatization is an important scheme to solve 
the flaw of the public asset ownerships.  However, it 
may affect the consumers’ rights inevitably in the 
post-privatization era.  Thus, the general public believed 
the intervention of the governmental regulations onto the 
private monopoly enterprises is highly necessary.  In 
theory, the effective governmental regulation shall 
establish a virtual near competition environment.  Thus 
the effective regulation can lower the costs of public 
services, increase the efficiency, and maintain the near 
market competition standards. (Shapiro & Willig, 1990)  
In another word, the goal of the effective government 
regulation is to replace the market competition, and the 
general public will be benefits from total market 
competition efficiency. (Burton, 1997)  The 
privatization and appropriate governmental regulation are 
the two key actions to expect to solve the monopoly and 
the issues derivates from the public ownerships.  This 
paper will review on the nature of the privatization 
regulation in the post-1984 era and explore the 
experiences from the other developed nations.  It is 
highly beneficial to some nations, which have not 
initiated the privatization, or as a reference towards to 
their privatization legalization. 
 
 
  
2. Paper Review 
The remarkable case of privatization in UK is the 
British Telecom (hereafter named: BT) in 1984.  Prior 
1984, the privatization in UK remained small and 
unnoticeable.  Post-1984 is a great move towards to the 
privatization era.  During the privatization of BT in UK, 
government also established the Office of 
Telecommunication, which shortens as Oftel, as a 
regulatory office for the new privatized monopolized 
industry.  It regulated the licenses for new 
telecommunication industry, call charges, wholesale rates.  
The Oftel model was also adopted in the privatization of 
the other large-scale state-owned-enterprises in UK.  
Thus, the industry, which regulated by the office, would 
be termed as “regulated enterprises”. 
 
During 1984-1991, the ruling party, conservative 
party, overturned the trend of the nationalized the 
state-owned-enterprises since WWII.  The government 
began to privatize the infrastructure of a nation, such as 
telecommunication, gas, water, waste-sewerage, 
electricity.  After that, the follow on governments also 
privatized the British railway while it was in government.  
The UK Government appointed one industry regulatory 
office to regulate the operation of the privatized 
monopoly industry after privatized one infrastructure.  
The UK regulatory office is operating different from the 
US governmental regulation commission.  On the 
contrary, the regulation office was lead by a single 
administrator in the office.  The office was empowered 
with high independence and jurisdiction even though it is 
a governmental office.  The administrator is not 
entitling as public servant and the budget of the office is 
collecting from its regulated enterprises.   
 
Because of that, the regulatory office is being 
defined as “independent” office.  However the operation 
of the office is never independent and not empowered 
with necessary power.  The totally “independence” 
literally means its zero liability to the public, because the 
office only report to parliament via the minister while the 
members of parliament have to liable to the general 
public.  Thus, the administrators have to publish its 
annual operation report to define its progress on 
regulation in the assigned industry.  The office also 
needs to make public hearing requested by its not 
parliament commission and/or auditing department.  
However, the UK government was not entitled to 
overturn or amend the established rules and the behaviors 
of the administrator/regulation office.  The undoubtedly 
fact is the parliament does have certain influence towards 
to regulation office and the ministers do have the actual 
power to intervene by exercising his/her entitlement.  
Until now, there was no obvious evidence to prove that 
any ministers ever intervene the regulation offices’ 
decision and its behaviors.  
  
Apart from the independence in the politics, the 
regulation office shall be a highly specialized 
organization in its field.  Each regulation offices are 
consists of many specialized experts, such as economists, 
accountants, and lawyers.  The UK government was 
trying its best efforts to maintain the independence of the 
regulation office, but the office shall consult the public to 
maximize the coverage in its policy.  For instance: the 
consumer councils of each monopolized enterprises shall 
raise some reference opinions on behalf of the 
consumers’ benefits.  Thus, the regulation system in UK 
does not represent any parties, but playing a totally 
independent, fair role to legislate the regulation rules to 
the general public.  It may not be an easy task to 
maintain with these two key factors, but it has been 
achieved in UK.  It is due to both the regulators and 
ministers to obeying the rules strictly to maintain such 
equilibrium.  This may not be an easy task in some 
nations where politics are severely involved with all 
legislations and operations throughout the government 
system.        
 
In the UK, the authority of the regulation office 
was empowered from the legislation of the privatization 
and the Competition and Services (Utilities) Act, 1992.  
In this Act, it forces the public utilities to follow the 
regulation on its service quality and the supplying.  The 
UK laws request the regulation office to complete two 
basic targets: 
 
1. To ensure that public services/utilities can 
meet all the reasonable demands from public. 
2. To ensure that all regulated enterprises to 
maintain the sufficient financial operation to 
supply high quality public utilities/services. 
 
Generally speaking, the regulation criteria are 
varying from industry to industry.  For instance in the 
gas industry (Gas Act, 1995), the first priority is to 
intensify the competition, while this is second priority in 
other industries.   
  
In UK, the legislation of the regulation rules does 
not just empower the regulation office to enforce the 
regulation rules, but to leave more space for regulation 
office to operate with norm.  (Colmon, 1997; Parker, 1997)  
In most privatization legislation, it is commonly seen the 
similar clause such as: “the minister and regulator were 
empowered to exercise their duty…  and take the relevant 
necessary action… ”.  According this clause, we can 
foresee that all the regulation bodies would take different 
approaches and subject to the terms of regulation 
administrator.  For instance, the current Gas Supply 
industry regulator has different measure in their term in 
office with their former regulators, although the 
regulations were all based on the Section 42(b) of l986 
Gas Acts .  Thus it can be seen that the regulators are 
empowered with huge power to exercise.  However, in 
many countries, it is difficult to accept that an authorized 
single regulator with huge authority to exercise.  While 
the US model would be a more acceptable model, and the 
regulation offices were consisted of many committee 
members to operate according to their prior legislations.   
 
Apart from the relevant regulations, each regulated 
enterprises must obtain the licenses from the ministers or 
its regulation office.  It must state the terms and 
conditions of operation in full details on the license, such 
as pricing, the wholesale rate, the rate of distribution 
network to other competitors.  In another words, the 
licenses are generally over hundred pages and have all 
details within.  However, the regulator remained power 
to define or amend the terms and conditions if necessary. 
 
Key difference between UK & US models 
When UK government began to privatization, they 
have studied the long established regulation system in US.  
But the UK regulation system is varying in four basic 
structures than US system:   
1. UK system centralized its authority to a 
single administrator rather 
authority-shared committee system.   
2. The UK government established one 
regulation office for each individual 
industry; while one US regulation 
commission is generally controls over 
number of industries.   
3. The level of juridical authority.  The 
UK system offers less likelihood of 
legal appeal for its regulated industry 
than US model. 
4. The profit regulation of pricing capping.  
 
The reason why the UK parliament adopted 
the single administrator model rather than US model?  
There are three main reasons: 
1. At the time UK government establishing 
regulation commission, there were not 
many regulation experts available at the 
time.  Thus, the UK government has to 
assign the regulation experts more 
precisely due to the human resource 
scarcity.   
2. The single administrator model can adopt 
into the regulated industry faster and 
enable an effective regulation. 
3. The ease of the accountability: it is 
relatively easy to measure the 
performance of the administrator.  The 
UK model is the appropriate model for 
those nations without 
prior-privatization-experiences. In contrast, 
the advantages of the US model enable the 
inter-industries regulations commission to 
transfer its effective regulations 
experiences to other industries.  While 
US model can also build a systematic 
regulations across the industry.   
 
Why the UK parliament adopted the model, which 
assigned a single regulator per industry, rather than US 
model?  There are three major factors: 
1. At the time, UK established the regulation 
office for the privatization; there were not too 
many regulation experts available.  Thus, 
the UK government has to assign precisely 
and thrifty due to the experts scarcity. 
2. Single regulator can adopted into the 
characteristics of the industry much faster 
and    perform the regulation more 
effectively. 
3. Ease of measures the performance: it is 
relatively easy to measure the performance of 
the regulator.  The UK model is appropriate 
to those countries, which never have 
privatization experiences.  In adversely, the 
advantage of the US model is the possibility 
to transfer their effective experience to other 
industries via the inter-industries regulation 
commission.  The US model can also build 
a more systematic regulation for other 
industries.   
    
  Until now, the UK government has no signs of 
showing to abandon the single administrator model, but 
there were some initiations to make amendments.  For 
instance, the business of the Oftel has expanded to across 
all telecommunication categories and likely to combined 
all as one.  The gas regulation office and electricity 
regulation offices may combine as one energy regulation 
office in the nearest future.  In the fact, the reality has 
forced the UK government to make some amendments to 
combine its regulation system.  For instance, the 
traditional telecommunication enterprises were 
challenged by the new emerging telecommunication 
enterprises.  The multi-faceted UK gas corporation has 
initiated its business in its power generation business 
while some electricity companies on the market began to 
offer gas supply service.  From these two cases, it has 
illustrated the UK regulations model would shift towards 
to US model in the future. 
 
According to the US government regulation, all 
parties include the regulated enterprises, consumer 
groups, and other interest groups shall report in the 
regulation public hearing.  According to the Federal 
Administration Act 1984, the US regulation model had 
developed in a model with more juridical 
contents.(Sappington, 1986)  In adversely in UK, the 
juridical department played a minor role in the regulation 
system.  It is almost impossible to challenge the 
regulation office’s decisions.  The Law can only offer 
the legal advises towards to the regulation decision 
procedure, such as obvious illegal and/or unreasonable 
policy making procedure rather than the comments on its 
decisions.  Until now,  it is rarely seen any juridical 
investigation towards to the regulation procedure. 
 
Since the legal procedure can not offer any appeal 
opportunities to their regulated enterprises, thus the 
MMC. (Monopoly and Merging Commission, shorted as 
MMC) has become the important organization to 
investigate any comments from the regulated enterprises.  
However, the MMC would involve to arbitrate only when 
the regulated enterprises conflicts with their regulated 
office in the license amendments.  Since 1992, the 
MMC has involved in 6 pricing amendments and 
dissolutions between the regulator and the regulated 
enterprises.  The MMC would only focus on any 
disciplines, which may obviously against public interests.  
If any of regulators’ operations may against the public 
interests, then MMC would request regulator to amend 
the existing policy and/or take necessary actions to 
recover the loss to the public interests.  However the 
MMC would not accept any appeals other than license 
operation conditions.  The less effective appealing has 
turned down the regulated enterprises to take any actions 
to against its regulation office, regardless from legally 
nor administratively.  Furthermore, the regulated 
enterprises are reluctant to solve any issues via MMC, 
because it normally makes the share prices fluctuate once 
the news disclosed to public.  The regulated enterprises 
also concerned that the excess internal information may 
disclose to the public during the investigation.  Thus, it 
is rarely seen any enterprises willing to appeal for a 
solution with its regulator via the MMC.  Therefore the 
UK has limited results to appeal via the administration 
and legal methods.  Since UK does not have appropriate 
formal law to regulate the regulator, thus there were 
many experts concerned that the UK regulators have 
been over-powered.      
 
    Veljonorski (1991, p.16) criticized the regulation 
office is a monster in the Constitution because the 
incompliance to its principles of control, audit, balance 
rule in the tradition democratic government system.  
This criticism is based on the viewpoints from the 
democratic regulation and the public liability.  Thus, 
some researchers of the same viewpoints emphasized that 
all regulation office shall account for the public liability 
and accept the certain democratic procedures such as the 
formal governmental norms, assignment procedure, and 
public hearings.  This statement may seem reasonable 
but may mislead to the general public. 
 
Common regulation models 
At the moment, the common democratic 
supervising procedures may not be appropriate to apply 
to the regulation office.  In the contrast, the substantive 
model could be more appropriate than democratic 
supervising procedures.  The legitimate of the 
substantive model shall acknowledge to the consistency 
of the government’s policy, the specialization in problem 
solving, public interests, exact regulation goals, and 
clearly defined power.  However, all these goals would 
be hard to achieve under the direct political controls. 
(Majone, 1996,1997)  The UK regulation model is 
classified as this substantive model.  The first goal the 
regulation is the effective regulation, which enhances the 
specialization in its practice, and maintains the 
independence in regulation.  In adversely, the US public 
utility regulation model is a hybrid model of the 
democratic model and substantive model.  Thus, the 
specialization and independence of regulation have to 
subject to the outcomes from the public hearings and 
legal investigations.   
 
We must admit that: the substantive model would 
be more appropriate than democratic model to reach the 
goal of “Economic efficiency” and “Pareto Optimum”.  
However, it is more appropriate to adopt the democratic 
model if some social goals wish to be achieved, such as 
equilibrium between the wealth and incomes.  Certainly, 
the regulation may result some resources re-distribution 
inevitably during the regulation, such as employment 
opportunities and the wealth.  Thus, it may not be easy 
to distinguish the social goals of the “economic 
efficiency” and “re-distribution” strictly.  Even though, 
the UK model can still view as a standard and substantive 
regulation model.  Until now, we can understand that 
why UK regulators did not involved with any “social 
engineering” and the UK researchers’ rejections to 
expand the regulation coverage to any social issues. 
(Foster, 1992, Ch.9)  If there were too many social 
issues involved in the regulations, it means more political, 
society democratic issues would take into account of the 
regulation model.  However, it may not be an easy task 
to seek an equilibrium state between the specialization 
independence and public liability.  From the routine 
operation of the regulation office, it may highly likely 
that any political interventions may involve while 
political frequently over power of its operation in some 
nations. 
 
In some nations, the society is difficult to accept 
any over-power economic forces, it would be necessary 
to induce some appropriate models to regulate.  
Therefore the appropriate model would suggest per: 
replaced the single administrator with panel of committee 
members, addition of the public hearings, judicial 
procedure, more intensify parliamentary supervision.   
     
In UK, the most of the public enterprises had turned 
nationalize since 1945.  The main motivation for such 
move was: the S.O.E. would perform better and fairer 
services because S.O.E. may not pursuit maximized 
profit as a goal.  To fulfill this goal, the UK government 
established the board of directors to all S.O.E..  The 
purpose of establishing board of directors is to minimize 
the excess interventions from government.  However, in 
reality, there were large numbers of political 
interventions remained existed and did not change even 
with the existence board of directors.  Till late 1970s, 
the S.O.E. had a very low morale internally regardless of 
the level of positions.  Furthermore, there were huge 
numbers of evidence and data has proved that the S.O.E. 
did not even meet the expected goals in its costs, capital 
investment ratio, and productivity. (Victors and Yarrow, 
1988, p.l51)    
 
The Conservative party ruling government was 
blamed for the failure of the public ownerships in 1979.  
General public are now viewing the privatization as a 
wonder solution towards to the poorly performed S.O.E. 
but may not necessarily lead to an improvement of the 
economic performance. ( Martin & Parker, 1997 )  For 
instance, the Jaguar automotives had privatized in July 
1984 but remained in poor economic status till the 
transferring of ownership to Ford in 1989.  In reality, 
the S.O.E. would generally improving in its operation 
performance due to the newly entered competitors.   
 
  
4. Discussions and Suggestions  
Discussion 
Generally, government is less likely to introduce to 
too much competition from its S.O.E., because excess 
competition may influence the profits to yield to the 
government and may cause bankruptcy or requirement of 
restructure to the S.O.E..  If any of these situations 
happened, the government must accountable for extreme 
liabilities and pressure.  All these facts are 
understandable while the UK’s experience in 
privatization also proved that it is rarely seen totally fair 
and effective competition for any S.O.E. in their 
industries.  It is because the government may offer 
S.O.E. with some subsidies and other aids from 
government while the private competitors hardly receive 
any.  For instance, UK began to liberate the market 
competition in the gas industry since 1982/3; however 
the real competition did not come into the game until the 
whole industry privatized.  The privatization of the 
telecommunication, gas and electricity had speed up the 
pace of the competition in those industries for the two 
major factors: 1. Privatization; 2. the effective regulation.  
Under the efforts from the UK regulatory office, they 
have intensified the competition in one industry.  UK 
gas has lowered its market share to 45% and the 
competition from its competitors remained growing.  
The whole gas market was liberated in 1998.  In the 
electricity industry, the electricity generation has entered 
the era of competition as beginning; while the electricity 
distributions industry was fully liberalized after 1999.  
The competition in the telecommunication is never calm 
if compared to other infrastructure industries in UK.  By 
the year of 1996, the telecommunication regulation office 
has issued 1,260 licenses, which included 3 public 
service licenses, 44 international call licenses and 18 
international call resell licenses. ( Oftel, 1997, p.96)   
 
4.1 Suggestions  
At the end, the performance measure of a regulated 
enterprises can be conducted from its productivity, 
profitability, price, service quality and numbers of staff 
employed.  To summarize the available regulation 
models of the developed countries, it is found that all 
government expecting to create better economic benefits 
via its effective governmental regulation.  As a result of 
that, the research is highly valuable for those developing 
countries or any government who are willing to conduct 
privatization in its nation as a reference. 
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